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Security

What decides a request, what is written down about it, what is encrypted and since when, and who can reach your machines. Each point says where you can check it.

Access

One policy engine for every request
The console, the API, the CLI, MCP, Git, the registries and the S3 gateway ask the same IAM evaluator. An explicit deny wins and nothing is allowed by default. The account owner holds a policy like everyone else; there is no owner shortcut in the code.
Conditions that fail closed
Policies can require a source network, a time window or a two-factor sign-in. When a request cannot supply the value, an allow does not apply and a deny does.
Single sign-on and two-factor sign-in
Connect an OIDC or SAML 2.0 identity provider and enforce it for your verified domains. Authenticator codes, passkeys, recovery codes, and an organization-wide requirement for a second factor.
Credential lifetime
The CLI’s key expires after 90 days. CI exchanges an OIDC token from GitHub Actions for short-lived access instead of storing a key. An assistant connected over MCP never exceeds the permissions of the person who approved it.
Policy simulation
dcloud iam policies simulate evaluates an action on a resource for a user or role, or for policy documents you pass in, and says which decision results.

A user with the policy below tried to terminate a machine:

{
  "Version": "2024-01-01",
  "Statement": [
    {
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Action": ["ec2:*"],
      "Resource": ["rn:dcloud:de1:0e03aa2c-6535-4b70-bdbf-83e043ea944d:ec2:*"]
    },
    {
      "Effect": "Deny",
      "Action": ["ec2:TerminateInstances"],
      "Resource": ["rn:dcloud:de1:0e03aa2c-6535-4b70-bdbf-83e043ea944d:ec2:instance/*"]
    }
  ]
}
Policy, captured on our test installation, 20 November 2026.
$ dcloud ec2 instances get i-98e408f6
id                      i-98e408f6
name                    web-1
state                   running
instanceType            performance-1x1
$ dcloud ec2 instances terminate i-98e408f6 --yes
error Not allowed: ec2:TerminateInstances on rn:dcloud:de1:0e03aa2c-6535-4b70-bdbf-83e043ea944d:ec2:instance/i-98e408f6. Ask an administrator for a policy that allows it.
The call, with that user’s access key, against a running machine.

Audit log

Recorded at the point where IAM decides, so a handler cannot forget it:

Writes
Every allowed write, and every refused one, recorded as Denied
Sensitive reads
Every read of secret material or source code, allowed or refused
Refused reads
Ordinary reads refused over the API, at most one entry a minute per principal and action, with a count of the rest
Sign-in
Sign-in and its failures, second factor and passkey changes, password resets, CLI and MCP approvals
Our staff
Every SSH certificate a member of our staff gets for one of your machines (below)
Not recorded
Allowed ordinary reads (lists, describes)
{
  "seq": 586423,
  "createdAt": "2026-11-20T13:22:19.728Z",
  "principal": "iam-user/developer",
  "callerType": "access_key",
  "accessKeyId": "EWS16HC68MFNDU5H09BB",
  "action": "ec2:TerminateInstances",
  "resourceRn": "rn:dcloud:de1:0e03aa2c-6535-4b70-bdbf-83e043ea944d:ec2:instance/i-98e408f6",
  "httpMethod": "DELETE",
  "requestPath": "/ec2/api/instances/i-98e408f6",
  "responseStatus": 403,
  "outcomeLabel": "Denied",
  "sessionContext": { "credential": "access-key", "mfa": false, "userVerified": false },
  "prevHash": "2fe9f5f862507a2faa6e287cea23ef6ee45b7aab09d1707bf43b56fa07351c20",
  "hash": "10d570ce13c9bf0f9a405bfca7e9be1a3676883229b6834aa7e78ca53066a710"
}
The audit entry the refused call left, from dcloud iam audit-logs list (excerpt).

Each entry carries the SHA-256 hash of the one before it. Every hour the head of the chain is signed with Ed25519. dcloud iam audit-logs verify recomputes the chain and checks the signatures, and the documentation shows how to check an export with your own script. Entries are kept 400 days by default (90 to 3,650), never deleted past the newest signature, and can be exported continuously to your own bucket.

$ dcloud iam audit-logs verify
ok               true
checkedRows      200000
startsAtGenesis  true
chainBreak       -
digests          checked 133, failed 0
                 latest signed at 2026-11-20T13:05:30Z, key ab78319176b91088
Verifying the chain on our test installation, 20 November 2026, excerpt.

The audit log: entries, chain, signatures, exports

Encryption

New disks since 12 November 2026

Disks
Every database, cache and file system created since 12 November 2026 has encrypted disks, and volumes are encrypted by default: LUKS2 with AES-256, one key per disk, wrapped by your own key if you choose one, and released only to the machine the disk is attached to. The console shows each database’s encryption. A database created before that date keeps plain disks; restore it into a new database to move it.
Backups
Backups and archived WAL of new databases are encrypted on the database machine before they are uploaded, with a key for that database alone.
Secrets and keys
Secrets are encrypted with AES-256-GCM under a key you manage, versioned, granted only to the services that use them, and every reveal is logged. Keys can be rotated, imported (BYOK) and scheduled for deletion after 7 to 30 days.
Connections
Certificates for the console and your apps are issued automatically. Databases require TLS by default, with certificates from our own CA, so sslmode=verify-full works.
Networks
Databases and caches are private to your network by default. People reach them through Client VPN, one granted target at a time.

Our access

Our staff reach a managed machine (database, cache, Kubernetes, VPN, NAT, file system, function and app machines) over SSH only for break-glass support. There is no shared key: a member of staff, signed in with a second factor, asks for a certificate for one named machine and gives a reason. It is valid for 15 minutes, only from the control plane’s address.

Every such certificate is written to your organization’s audit log before it is issued, as operator:IssueSshCertificate: who, which machine, why, valid until. Your own instances never trust our certificate authority.

Machines created before 13 November 2026 still accept the earlier operator key until they are replaced.

Technical and organisational measures

Platform

Images scanned on push
Every image pushed to the container registry is scanned with Trivy, with findings next to the tag.
Dependencies watched
The platform’s dependencies are checked for known vulnerabilities every six hours, and updates are automated.
Hardened console
Content Security Policy, HSTS and frame denial on the console, and a published security.txt.
Isolated builds and CI runs
Each build and each CI run gets a fresh machine that is deleted afterwards, with credentials scoped to that run.
What runs on your machines
Every managed service documents what software runs on its machines, what the platform does there and as which role. Managed PostgreSQL, for example.

Not covered

  • Deutsche Cloud holds no security certificate of its own yet. The data centres are Hetzner’s, under Hetzner’s ISO/IEC 27001 and BSI C5 attestation (compliance).
  • Keys are held in software under the platform key. There is no hardware security module.
  • Your own instances are yours to patch, unless you turn on nightly security updates.

Security whitepaper

Report a vulnerability

Write to security@platform.deutschecloud.app with what you found, how to reproduce it and how to reach you. Machine-readable: security.txt.

Do not access other customers’ data, and do not run load or denial-of-service tests.